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As the speed of Internet access improves, the film industry will need to 
explore its options for eliminating the downloading of digital movie files.  
After examining the successes and failures of the music industry in its battle 
with peer-to-peer networks, the film industry has begun to follow its 
predecessor.  However, the nature of film as an entertainment medium is 
quite different than that of music.  As a result, the film industry could 
implement creative solutions to this problem that would not have been 
available to the music industry.  A recent study shows that most films 
available on the Internet have been leaked by industry insiders.  By 
implementing an increasingly publicized use of trade secret litigation, the 
film industry could take a tough and effective stance against the digital 
dragon.   
INTRODUCTION  
¶1 In the summer of 2003, the music industry sent a shockwave through the entertainment world with its 
unprecedented legal attack against the downloading of copyrighted material from the Internet.2  After the 
destruction of Napster, the industry felt that it could replace the free program for downloading music with a 
pay-to-download model.3  This has proven unsuccessful because, like the mythical Greek hydra, the music 
industry’s elimination of Napster has caused even more free file download options to develop.4  In a move 
that could be part legal strategy and part desperation, the music industry has recently resorted to filing 
lawsuits against individual users of networks for downloading music.5  Suddenly, lawsuits are being 
distributed “randomly” to those downloading copyrighted music; it seems that the music industry is making 
defendants out of all walks of American life, from college students6 to retired schoolteachers.7 
¶2 While the music industry wages this battle, the film industry has watched and learned.  On November 
11, 2002, the film industry engaged in its first offensive action by providing consumers with a way to access 
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films quickly and allow them to be viewed on a computer.8  Five of the biggest film studios came together to 
create Movielink, a service which allows subscribers to rent films online.9  When a user chooses a film, he or 
she can begin viewing the film at any point in the next 30 days.10  Once the film is started, it can be played an 
unlimited number of times over the next 24 hours.11  Although the Movielink experiment is less than a year 
old, one cannot help but compare this attempt by the film industry to capitalize from the offering of films 
online to that of the music industry’s attempt to turn Napster into a profitable enterprise.12  Based on the 
music industry’s limited success with defeating the downloading of digital files, the last thing the movie 
studios would want to do is follow this example. 
¶3 To this end, the film industry, led by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), must stop 
following in the footsteps of the music industry and should instead forge its own path towards successfully 
defeating this increasing business threat.  The movie industry must focus on how movies as an art form are 
inherently different from music and use those differences to develop creative solutions to the problem of 
digital piracy.    One promising avenue of recourse for the film industry is the use of trade secret litigation to 
prosecute the source of pirated movies: industry insiders. 
MOVIES VERSUS MUSIC 
¶4 The film industry, as represented by the MPAA, currently claims to lose 3 billion dollars every year 
as a result of piracy.13  Film as a medium lends itself to more flexibility and therefore a better method with 
which to address the digital piracy problem than the music industry, which has lost 2.4 billion dollars this 
year.14  Although a few film production companies have participated as plaintiffs in some of the attacks 
against the music file sharing programs,15 the film industry as a whole has remained relatively inactive.  The 
main reason for this is that the film latter has not felt as threatened as the music industry because of the 
current state of technology.  A typical music file can be downloaded on a modem in approximately 20 
minutes or 3 minutes through broadband cable.16  An entire film takes around 24 hours to download by 
modem or 3 to 4 hours on broadband cable.17  Because of this large discrepancy between the lengths of time 
required for download, the film industry has not felt the impact of a digital threat.  However, that is changing.  
                                                     
8Anna Wilde Mathews, Hollywood Studios Will Launch Paid Service for Online Movies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2002, at B7.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 47. 
13 Motion Picture Association of America’s Statement on Anti-Piracy, at http://www.mpaa.org/anti-
piracy/index.htm.  
14 Study: Music Piracy Has 5 Years of Growth, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 23, 2003. 
15 See Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.Cal. 2003); but see A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
16 Ted Greenwald, Decoding the Codecs, WIRED MAG., Aug. 1999. 
As technology improves, the speed of home Internet access will be faster and the ability of the large movie 
files to be compressed into smaller files will increase as well.  The digital threat is looming on the horizon and 
the film industry must take affirmative action to protect itself against piracy.   
¶5 Additionally, the manner in which a typical consumer might experience the film affects the potential 
solutions to the piracy problem.  Someone who possesses an MP3 might wish to listen to the song repeatedly 
or burn it onto a CD for even more play time in the car or on a personal walkman, etc.  However, a film is 
different, as many argue that the experience of watching a movie in a theater is an attraction that no amount of 
digital pirating could ever replace.18  Also, the desire of repeat viewing of a movie does not compare with that 
of a song.  In fact, very few patrons of movie theaters will view a movie an additional time.19  Finally, a key 
difference between film and music is the quality that digital pirating provides.  Currently, an MP3 can have 
quality equal to that of a track found on the original CD;20 however, a pirated film rarely has the same quality 
as a DVD.  
¶6 Because of the differences inherent in the digital pirating of music and film, movie studios find 
themselves in a much more advantageous position from which to defend their products and profits from 
pirating attack.  A solution such as Movielink would have been impossible for the music industry to 
implement, because the limitation of only listening to a song for 24 hours without copying it to a CD does not 
compare with a pirated copy that allows for unlimited uses.  Although Movielink and other solutions of this 
type from the film industry would have certain inherent restrictions, these restrictions are more compatible 
with the practical desires of the consumer.  However, this is a solution that is a long way off, because the 
movie studios must strike a balance between pleasing the customer at a price that falls within their profit 
margins.  Until that balance is reached, the film industry can not afford a piracy price tag of three billion 
dollars a year; it must take immediate action. 
“THE INSIDER”  
¶7 In order to prevent piracy, the film industry could target the consumer of the pirated material, the 
source of the pirated material, or the middle-man.  (For comparison purposes, when the music industry and, to 
a lesser extent, the film industry target services such as Napster,21 Kazaa,22 and Grokster,23 they are attacking 
the middle-man of the pirating process.)  Recent lawsuits have turned the attack against consumers as the 
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music industry has chosen to pursue individuals engaging in music piracy.24  However, a party which has 
remained relatively untouched by legal action is the source of the pirated material.  For the music industry, 
this would have been a fruitless avenue to pursue because the sources of most MP3s were the consumers 
themselves, as they burned the songs off of legally-purchased CDs.25  However, for the film industry, finding 
the sources of the material could prove to be the best way to combat piracy. 
¶8 Although there are inherent disadvantages and risks to this course of action, the low cost on the part 
of the film industry in finding these sources should be enough of an incentive to take action.  In addition, 
attacking the source of the material is a relatively risk-free venture in terms of to public relations, as compared 
to the abysmal reaction that the music industry has received from its pursuit of the consumers of the pirated 
product26.  The only real problem for music studios is the challenge of finding the source of this pirated 
material.  To this end, AT&T Labs have published a report entitled “Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in 
the Movie Production and Distribution Process.”27 
¶9 This report studied any film in the U.S. box office’s top fifty films that appeared online between the 
dates of January 1, 2002 and June 27, 2003.28  In this time period, the study engaged a sample size of 285 
films.29  The study examined the online versions of the films and studied the picture and sound quality, along 
with any other telltale signs of illegal copying.30  Additionally, the study focused on the dates on which the 
films first appeared online in comparison with their theater release date and home video release date.31  By 
inspecting the quality of the file, any other signs of the film’s source, and the online date, the report was able 
to hypothesize as to the origin of these illegal online copies.32 
¶10 The results of AT&T Labs’ report was eye-opening and provides a good first step for the film 
industry in solving the digital piracy problem.  Of the movie samples examined, 77% appear to have been 
leaked by industry insiders.33  Seven of the films appeared online prior to their theater release date and 163 
were online prior to the film’s DVD release date,34 but only 5% of the films that had been released on DVD at 
the conclusion of the study appeared online after their DVD release date.35  The report also noted that there 
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were two time frames during which the majority of leaks occurred: the two weeks surrounding the film’s 
theater release and the three weeks leading up to the DVD release date.36 
¶11 These results suggest that the biggest source of digital pirated films is in fact industry insiders.  This 
trend is demonstrated not only by the quality of the digital copies but by the noting the time at which these 
copies appear online.  If these results reflect the reality of the current situation, there are a few privileged 
members of the film community who are using their status and access to the films illegally to pirate movies on 
the Internet.  These trends give the film industry a unique advantage over the music industry, and provide the 
former with the chance to dramatically slow the receipt of pirated movies on the Internet. 
“T2: JUDGMENT DAY” 
¶12 There are several reasons to explain why pursuing industry insiders in the fight against film piracy is 
easier than the struggle experienced by the music industry.  First, the source of the pirated information – 
industry insiders – is a relatively small and contained group of people.  An aggressive prosecution strategy 
against insiders in the film industry has great advantages over the music industry’s prosecution of the large 
population of consumers of pirated material.  There will be relatively no adverse public outcry as a result of 
prosecuting a few select people who are directly stealing information from the film industry as compared to 
the widespread and seemingly random prosecution of “everyday” people.37  The limited number of targets for 
prosecution will also be advantageous for the film industry because it will dramatically reduce litigation costs. 
¶13 The second advantage for the film industry’s pursuit of the source of pirated material is that lawsuits 
will be relatively painless and without much controversy.  Instead of the figurative briar patch that has 
accompanied the prosecution of distributors38 and consumers of pirated material,39 the film industry may be 
able to use trade secret law in order to obtain judgments in its favor.  A simple formula has been established 
in previous trade secret litigation to efficiently determine trade secret infringers; the ease with which these 
insiders fit each requirement of this formula will further simplify the proceedings. 
¶14 According to § 39 of the Restatement of Unfair Competition, a trade secret is defined as “any 
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable 
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”40  An unreleased film (either in 
the theaters or onto a home video format) fits this definition.  Films constitute one component of a very 
lucrative business; according to the MPAA, that business is losing a substantial amount or revenue due to the 
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release of these products prematurely.41  Additionally, by taking active steps to keep the film a secret, the 
creators of the film possess a great financial advantage over any other distributors of the same product.  Given 
these facts, there can be no doubt that a film must be considered a trade secret. 
¶15 Because films may constitute trade secrets, anyone with access to that film before it is released to the 
public has a duty to keep that information confidential.  This duty is established in § 41 of the Restatement 
and can be enforced by the employer if the employee has made an express promise of confidentiality or if the 
employee should have known that the trade secret was to be kept in confidence.42  Even if an insider in the 
film industry has not signed an express confidentiality agreement, he or she should know to keep this 
information in confidence given the lengths that each studio goes through to keep its films from the public 
until their release dates. 
¶16 Finally, § 40 sets out the elements of a trade secret case.  The actor must a) acquire the information 
improperly or b) disclose that information without the other’s consent assuming that the actor knew or had 
reason to know that the information was a trade secret while breaking a § 41 duty of confidence.43  By 
definition, a source of pirated material has improperly acquired the information in question; however this 
element may be difficult to prove when authorized industry insiders are in possession of films.  Because 
employment may require them to possess these pre-release movies, the acquisition may be considered proper, 
in which case the first element of a trade secret case is not satisfied.  However, despite this technicality, the 
insider likely knew that the information was a trade secret and therefore breached a duty of confidence.44  
Thus trade secret may be easily proven in the case of industry insiders using confidential materials to facilitate 
piracy on the Internet. 
¶17 There is, however, one major flaw in this type of trade secret litigation.  The most comprehensive 
award given as damages under state statutes has been injunctive relief and monetary damages.45  This is too 
little, too late for most major studios who feel that billions are lost in profit due to pirating.46  Also, the insider 
could be fired for his or her actions, but it is again doubtful whether this is sufficient compensation for the 
studio.  Film studios may lobby for the ability to prosecute these offenders under the threat of criminal 
sanctions.  Movie creators would like to see these trade secret violators serve significant incarceration 
sentences for their blatant disregard for the confidentiality of pre-release movies.  Furthermore, for deterrent 
effect, the film industry would also like for the prosecution and incarceration of these sources to receive 
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substantial publicity.  However, these goals may prove difficult if not impossible to achieve.  Most recently, 
Kerry Gonzalez pleaded guilty to a federal felony copyright infringement change for taking part in releasing 
an unfinished version of “The Hulk”47 two weeks before its theater release date.48  The District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ordered Gonzalez to six months home confinement, three years of probation, a 
$2,000 fine, and $5,000 in restitution to Universal Pictures.49  Despite the fact that the defendant pleaded 
guilty to a felony charge, the court refused to require that he serve time for his offense.  The film industry 
would be able to prosecute more defendants with easier and more consistent results if it scaled back its 
litigation to trade secret infringement instead of other alternatives.  Although jail time may prove unavailable 
for the pirates, large monetary judgments could give the film industry a strong stance with which to attack the 
illegal piracy of movies. 
CONCLUSION 
¶18 The problem of digital pirating is a difficult one with no easy solutions.  However, one thing seems 
clear:  The closer the film industry treads on the same path of the music industry, the more likely they will 
both experience limited success in the quest to end digital piracy.  The use of trade secret litigation against 
insiders of the industry providing pirated material is by no means the perfect answer, but it is a powerful and 
relatively unused weapon with which the film industry could make some noticeable headway.  Trade secret 
litigation could be effective used to prosecute those involved in illegal pirating of movies, thereby allowing 
the industry to reap the benefits of its movie-making efforts.   
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